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Traditional process hazard analysis (PHA), such as Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) studies, 
typically includes a systematic assessment of initiating events and consequences affecting 
process facilities. Relationships among initiating events, safeguards, and consequences are 
evaluated in depth, but such evaluation is generally based on unintentional causes such as human 
error or some unexpected failure of equipment, instrumentation, controls, or safeguards. As the 
process industry evolves toward greater reliance on and integration with information technology, 
it is critical to also consider malicious and intentional disruption of process operations by parties 
who exploit the enhanced capabilities and integration of modern communication with process 
controls and operations. 
This paper discusses the significance of considering cybersecurity threats during a PHA/HAZOP. 
A step-by-step and systematic technique is presented to show how a PHA team could assess the 
vulnerability of a system or facility to potential cyber threats, analyze adequacy of safeguards, 
and develop necessary countermeasures to resist cyberattacks. A typical refinery or chemical 
plant can have thousands of signals that are connected to a Distributed Control System (DCS) to 
ensure safe and smooth process operation. This arrangement could inadvertently present multiple 
pathways for malicious parties to intervene by manipulating signals or disrupting 
communications, potentially leading to severe process hazards and consequences such as a fire, 
explosion and fatality. Not only does incorporating cybersecurity in a PHA/HAZOP help identify 
the vulnerability of your system or facility, it could also be used to prioritize limited resources to 
ensure critical vulnerabilities are mitigated in a timely and efficient manner. The application of 




Process hazard analysis (PHA) is an essential element of process safety management and widely 
adopted to evaluate systematically the hazards associated with process plant design and operation 
and to minimize the risks associated with such hazards. Traditional methods such as Hazard and 
Operability (HAZOP) and What-If/ Checklists have been successfully applied by using a team 
based approach to evaluate potential design flaws or deviations from safe design and operational 
practices as well as to identify initiating events, assess potential consequences of such events, 
and implement acceptable safeguards or barriers to prevent or mitigate the consequences. 
Relationships among initiating events, safeguards, and consequences are evaluated in depth, but 
generally based on unintentional causes such as human error or some unexpected failure of 
equipment, instrumentation, controls, or safeguards. 
 
As the process industry evolves toward greater reliance on and integration with information 
technology, it is critical to also consider malicious and intentional disruption of process 
operations by parties who might exploit the enhanced capabilities and integration of modern 
communication with process controls and operations. 
Attacks using cyber technology on process facilities have been well-publicized, such as the 
socalled Stuxnet computer worm that might have infected industrial control systems in several 
countries, impacting plant operations and damaging plant equipment. Another cyberattack using 
so-called spear-phishing techniques has apparently occurred at a German steel mill, impacting 
both control and safety instrumented systems and resulting in physical damage to a furnace 
system. Common types of cyberattacks together with further details on the examples cited above 
are provided below. 
Total costs to companies which are victims of cyberattacks are easily in the billions of dollars per 
year and are likely under-reported as companies seek to avoid negative publicity and loss of 
clients or business as well as many companies may not have resources to detect and recover from 
such attacks, let alone to prevent future attacks.1 Therefore, the impacts of cyberattacks have 
often been realized but not fully quantified. 
A systematic method to integrate cybersecurity analysis as part of a PHA/HAZOP is presented in 
this paper. 
 
Types of Attack 
 
Cyberattack vulnerability could be traced to the exploitation of various complex network loop 
holes thus allowing malicious software to penetrate inadequate firewalls or be introduced into a 
computer network by means of a USB thumb drive. A list of some of the common cyberattack 
methods is highlighted below.2 
 Malware: Code with malicious intent that typically steals data or destroys something on 
the computer. 
 Phishing: Phishing emails include a link that directs the user to a dummy site that will 
steal a user’s information. In some cases, all a user has to do is click on the link. 
 Man in the Middle (MITM): Gains access through a non-encrypted wireless access point. 
They would then have access to all of the control information being transferred between 
both DCS and equipment. 
 Malvertising: Compromise your computer with malicious code that is downloaded to 
your system when you click on an affected ad. 
 Rogue Software: Malware that masquerades as legitimate and necessary security software 
that will keep your system safe. 
 Drive-By Downloads: Through malware on a legitimate website, a program is 
downloaded to a user’s system. It doesn’t require any type of action by the user to 
download. 
While it would be unreasonable to expect a typical PHA team to address in detail the 
vulnerability of a process plant to such cyberattack methods, the team should at a minimum 
check that such an assessment has been completed (outside of the PHA) and resulting findings 
adequately resolved. The PHA team could also check that a cybersecurity program has been 
implemented at the site, consistent with current industry best practices, such as the ISA/IEC 
62443 series and particularly ISA/IEC 62443-3-2 standard (Security Risk Assessment and 
System Design) 3 which is pending ballot/ release.  
Such assessment would include an extensive mapping of the control system network 
architecture, detailing how control and communication functions are implemented between the 
DCS and field devices such process sensors and actuators for control valves. In addition, 
communication links between the control system and the network or workstation operating 
system environment as well as with the business enterprise software and the outside world 
(through the internet) are mapped as well and then partitioned into zones with conduits allowing 
for communication between zones based on the type and criticality of function, access control, 
etc. Target security risk levels are assigned for each zone, and appropriate safeguards 
implemented to ensure target levels are met. 
1. Case Study Malware Attack: The Stuxnet Virus Centrifuge Breach 
The Stuxnet was introduced by the infection of a computer and propagated to all other 
connected machines running Microsoft Windows. Stuxnet was a malicious worm virus. 
 
The virus apparently compromised the target systems at the Iranian Natanz nuclear plant 
and took control of the centrifuges, misleading operations by overriding the process 
variables and giving false feedback to the outside controllers (alarm and automatic safety 
shutdown system) and thus reportedly caused the impacted centrifuges to spin outside 
their safety operating limits and to fail eventually. 
 
Later, a separate operating company confirmed a potential Stuxnet virus breach on its 
machines, indicating the virus might have inadvertently spread beyond its intended target 
(Natanz plant) possibly due to a programming error and thus allowing the worm to spread 
from an engineer's infected computer to the internet. 4 
 
2. Case Study Spear-Phishing Attack: Steel Mill Furnace Breach 
Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security (or BSI), indicated the attackers 
gained access to a steel mill through its business network and then worked their way into 
the production network, gaining access to the control systems for plant equipment. 5 This 
type of attack is known as “Jumping” where the intrusion is in one area of the company’s 
network but then jump to another. The breach was in the business network but leaped to 
the production network. The attack reportedly resulted in loss of shutdown control on one 
of the blast furnaces and physical damage to equipment. 
As experts, in the cyber world, race to keep up with the evolving nature of the attacks, hackers 
are constantly deploying new ways to infiltrate and cause harm or damage. Beyond 
implementing robust information technology (IT) practices to detect and ward off malicious 
software as well as recover from such attacks, it is also important to raise organizational 
awareness, identify vulnerabilities, and develop effective countermeasures by using all other 
available tools. 
The PHA process lends itself well as an effective tool to support such efforts. By systematically 
evaluating the hazards associated with each section of the facility, the PHA team should already 
have a well-documented understanding of the type of consequences for various initiating events 
and the effectiveness of available safeguards. Historically, PHA’s have been focused on 
preventing and mitigating consequences categorized usually in terms of safety, asset 
damage/business interruption, environment, and reputation. Cyberattacks have the potential to 
inflict any of such consequences, and traditional PHA’s could be leveraged to help minimize 
them. 
A traditional PHA team is comprised of representatives from different areas such as operations, 
engineering (different disciplines), and management who collectively review and discuss what 
could go wrong at a process plant and how to prevent the associated consequences. Equipped 
with the right mix of skillset among the PHA team members, the team should be able to 
recognize what types of initiating events are relevant to the undesirable consequences to be 
prevented and what safeguards would be considered effective. Using a typical nodal approach, 
the PHA team would evaluate each section of the plant systematically in this context and develop 
recommendations for improvement as needed. 
Taking a step further, the PHA team could include an assessment of cybersecurity threats and 
vulnerabilities, their potential consequences, and safeguards under consideration. With qualified 
Instrumentation and Control (I&C) and Information Technology (IT) subject matter experts 
participating in the PHA’s, weak points in the control and communication systems that might be 
exploited by hackers to gain access and cause harm could be identified and eliminated. A couple 




There are two general methods to perform a PHA integrated cybersecurity assessment. 
• The first method is used to assess the basic process control system (BPCS) 
vulnerabilities as an independent node, such as by means of a Control Systems 
Hazard and Operability Study (CHAZOP) which could be extended to cover 
cybersecurity vulnerability. 
This method controls the cyber risk through process controls network (PCN). For example, 
instrumentation or process measurements which are attached to the Distributed Control System 
(DCS) may be vulnerable to an attack, such as the MITM type of attack as reportedly deployed 
with the Stuxnet virus. For critical applications, emergency shutdown systems involving 
dedicated sensors, logic solver, final control elements, and communication pathways which are 
independent of the BPCS might be warranted such as those typically implemented as part of a 
Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) or automated Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system. 
• The second method, based on an integrated cyber process hazard analysis, could also 
be used to assess the process system cyber vulnerabilities by integrating with a typical 
PHA and is applied to control the cyber risk by implementing non-hackable 
countermeasures. 
Table 1: Example of Cyber Integrated 
PHA Worksheet 
 
The second method, integrated cyber process hazard analysis, will be described further in this 
paper. Adding cybersecurity analysis to a typical PHA requires a step by step systematic 
technique in the review of the cyberattack impacts and countermeasures. This approach could 
also be used as a “stand alone” or backup to the first method. If the BPCS is compromised, 
applications that have been reviewed using integrated cyber process hazard analysis method 
could lessen the overall risk impact.  
This method considers the initiating event and safeguards to determine if they can be hacked and 
if the consequence is ranked significant. If so, the Process Hazard Team could specify 
instrumentation plus other mechanisms required to mitigate similar gaps using devices that could 
not be hacked. Device and instrumentation such as pressure safety valve (PSV), level gauges, 
pressure and temperature indicators that are not integrated into the DCS system and Operations 
External Monitoring could provide useful back-ups in the event of cyberattacks. 
Table 1 shows an application of integrated cyber process hazard analysis. The initiating event is 
related to a pressure control valve located at the inlet of a pressure vessel and which could fail 
wide-open. Such failure would have been evaluated in a traditional PHA as possibly caused by 
mechanical or electrical malfunction. However, one could also observe that the operation of this 
control valve could also be vulnerable to cyberattack. 
The Risk Ranking (RR) before safeguard consideration is an overall 6 based on severity level of 
3 and likelihood level of 2. Based on the risk matrix used for this example, a scenario with an RR 
of 6 can continue to operate only if safeguards are in place to prevent personnel injury. 
One might be tempted to take credit for a local pressure indicator/ gauge as a safeguard (SG). 
While this indicator is not vulnerable to cyberattack, it would require timely and reliable human 
intervention to be considered effective. The PHA team concluded that such instrumentation even 
together with human intervention would not be considered an acceptable safeguard as the 
indicator is not continuously monitored. Similarly, a pressure transmitter and its associated high-
pressure alarm PAH-002, even if independent of the process control loop for the PCV-001 and 
continuously monitored, would also not be reliable as the pressure signal could be vulnerable to 
manipulation during a cyberattack. 
A recommendation was then developed to install an adequately sized PSV to be routed to a safe 
location. Note that this PSV would not be vulnerable to cyberattack as its opening behavior is 
dependent on the vessel operating pressure as well as on the closing force exerted by the spring 
of the PSV. 
 
  
While defending against all forms of cyber intrusion into the plant control system and operation 
is the ultimate goal, the integrated cyber PHA is also well-positioned to help plant personnel 
identify critical cyber vulnerabilities that could potentially expose the company to the most 
severe consequences with associated risk that might fail to meet the company’s acceptance 
criteria and thus prioritize the allocation of scarce resources to enhance protection. 
Safeguards 
Performing an integrated cyber PHA requires one to control threats, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences. In order for a typical cyberattack to propagate from initiation to completion, it 
would typically require that both the initiating event and the safeguard(s) both be hackable. By 
making at least one of these two be non-hackable, the risk would substantially be reduced. By 
making both be non-hackable, the risk would be eliminated. For example, can a USB port be 
used to compromise the system? Then the first order of controls is to deactivate the ports. This 
would eliminate a conduit whereby the virus could intentionally or inadvertently be introduced 
into the system. Table 2 is an example of a Cyber Vulnerability Matrix that can be used during 




Table 2: Cyber Vulnerability Matrix 
Note: N=No and Y=Yes 
 
By understanding the different types of cyber threats that a process could be exposed to, one 
could then fully comprehend the in-place risks and develop effective mitigations to reduce or 
eliminate the risk. Staff training on cybersecurity awareness is essential to the understanding of 
cyber threats and safeguarding against them. Integrated cyber PHA could be used to enhance 
both awareness and readiness of plant personnel against cyber threats. 
Table 3 contains examples of safeguards that would be resistant to cyberattack for different 
scenarios. To the extent that one could rely on devices that operate independently of the control 
system, common mode failure could be avoided. For example, a spring-operated PSV would 
relieve excess system pressure without relying on a signal from the DCS. 
In terms of designing safeguards, there is a well-established concept called “defense-in-depth” 
which includes multiple independent layers of protection to protect against process hazards. In 
the context of cyberattacks, such layers might include but not limited to company policies and 
operating procedures, personnel training, network compartmentation, access restriction, physical 
barriers, installing software patches for operating systems, running up-to-date antivirus software, 
and continuous system monitoring to detect and contain intrusion. 
With regards to SIS, IEC 61511 (Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process 
Industry Sector) 6 has implemented a new clause, requiring that a security risk assessment shall 
be carried out to identify the security vulnerabilities of the SIS. The PHA team could also check 




Ultimately, the integrated cyber PHA results could help determine what countermeasures would 
be needed to lessen the cyberattack risks. In additional, the PHA along with a Layer of Protection 
Analysis (LOPA) could help with prioritizing resources for implementing required 
countermeasures. If the risk for a particular cyberattack is not considered significant, then it 
could be protected by using standard safeguards. However if a scenario has signification 
Table 3: Examples of Cyber Secure 
Instrumentation 
 
consequences or risks and all safeguards could be compromised, the application would likely 
need at least one cyberattack resistant safeguard. Since the timing or type of a cyberattack cannot 
be fully predicted, the integrated cyber PHA could serve as a useful tool to reduce the overall 
risk profile of a process plant against such attacks. 
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